2000 Annual Report

The Illegal Use of Explosives in Australia

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Message from the Director

2000 was a big year for the Australian Bomb Data Centre (ABDC). The Sydney Olympics was an obvious high point but not so obvious was the enhancement of the ABDC information management capability. A quick overview of our history will explain this statement.

The ABDC was officially raised in 1978 and in the subsequent 22 years we have witnessed significant changes and events in the Australian community. Australians also experienced the impact of politically motivated violence with the detonation of an explosive device outside the Hyatt Hotel in Sydney. This was the venue for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). At this time the ABDC maintained a manual card file system to index all reports received from jurisdictions and the Telex was the mode of communication.

In 1986 elements of a radical terrorist group detonated an explosive device in the car park of the building housing the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne. However at this time the ABDC used a ‘modern’ computer based database to maintain its index of incidents. It held only simple key words, numbers and limited text but allowed rapid identification of relevant files and highlighted any links within other reports that could then be manually searched. The mode of communication was the facsimile.

The year 2000 proved to be both challenging and satisfying to the staff of the ABDC and saw the implementation of a new database system that incorporates all the features necessary to efficiently record and retrieve information encompassing every aspect on an explosive related incident. The mode of communication is now E-mail and the Internet is the source of much information on the manufacture and use of home made explosives. Unfortunately the information often fails to indicate the inherent dangers involved with manufacturing and using explosive substances and devices.

Not only did the ABDC continue to review and refine the way we do business in 2000, but we also undertook extensive planning in preparation for our role in the security framework for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Given the profile of the Games and the incumbent security surrounding what turned out to be “the best games ever”; the role of the ABDC as the Australian focal point for all information relevant to the unlawful use of explosives was an important aspect.

Of course we now know that the Games progressed with no explosive related incidents to mar a magnificent sporting festival. This is in no small part due to the excellent planning and preparation undertaken by all agencies involved in security of the Games, and also to the level of cooperation and professionalism exhibited throughout the Games period by all involved.

We now look forward to the challenges of 2001, not the least of which will be the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to be held in Brisbane in October. I am sure the staff of the ABDC will continue to deliver the same high level of support and continue to develop into a world class resource.

Personally I look forward to another successful year that will see further development of the ABDC capability and I wish you all the best for 2001.

Terry Vincent
Director Australian Bomb Data Centre, 30 March 2001

Invitation to the 2001 ABDC Conference

The Annual ABDC Conference will be held at the National Convention Centre (Canberra) during the first week of December 2001. It will be run over three days, with open and closed (restricted access) sessions.

During the open session commercial interests may seek to display their products, or give a presentation on the technology behind the equipment and it’s capabilities.

Further details of the conference will be distributed by the end of June 2001; however should you require any further information, please contact Federal Agent Mark Simpson at the ABDC.

We look forward to seeing you at the conference.
The Australian bombing scene for 2000 remained benign.

The year saw unprecedented protective security established in support of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The period passed quietly from a bomb response perspective, with insignificant hoax activity and the inevitable, although very few, bomb threat calls being directed at the Games.

Elsewhere, significant bombings did occur however, in the remote mining towns of Coober Pedy, South Australia (18 June & 11 August) and Ora Banda, Western Australia (13 October & 6 November). These attacks resulted in significant property damage, but were without injury. Articles on these incidents appear in this Report.

By and far, the most prolific nuisance affecting Australia remains the ongoing acts of minor vandalism, using crude, hand placed and ignited, CO2 soda bulb devices. In the main most of these incidents can be attributed to ‘sky larking’ youths, destroying residential letterboxes.

The same motive and devices also feature prominently in parks, playgrounds and public areas. Statistically these are reflected as experimentation, unless property has been damaged.

The hazard to our youth, and any unfortunate bystander, from these devices should not be underestimated. In 1999 a fatality resulted during youth experimentation.

A notable use of fireworks to commit similar minor acts of vandalism was also noted.

Initiating methods have been reported in the Annual Report for the first time. In the main improvised wicks or burning fuse feature. There has however been instances where a timer, victim operated or command detonated device have been encountered.

In reviewing the initiation method statistics a high percentage of ‘unknown’ methods will be noted. This is not cause for concern as most of the incidents relate to CO2 soda bulb bombings. In such events, the crude igniferous initiators are normally completely expended, leaving little for examination.

Reports of attempted theft using explosives relate to minor crime. These by and large involve crude devices being used against public phone boxes in a presumed attempt to access the coin box. All attempts this year have failed, despite nearly all devices functioning, and telephone equipment being damaged.

An increase of incidents involving the mixing of household chemicals, causing low explosive reactions, was noted. In the main these devices were functioned in open areas and the motive again is attributed to sky larking youth.

The few incidents of revenge attacks, notwithstanding the bombings at the mining towns, have generally been low key. Motivation for these events has been either neighbourhood or juvenile disputes.

The availability of ‘recipes’ and instructions for the construction of explosive devices proliferated by the Internet remains of concern. There have been two incidents this year, a fatality in 1999 and several incidents in past years where children and youths have been injured when experimenting with Internet ‘recipes’.

This dangerous pastime has seen the death of a 17 year old in Swan Hill last year (1999), severe facial injuries to a 12 year old in Canberra (July 2000) and the traumatic amputation of a 17 year old’s hand in Melbourne (December 2000). Additionally, in late November 2000 a Blue Mountains teenager manufactured a quantity of home made explosives, which his mother removed from the refrigerator and placed, beneath their house.

Several incidents of theft and recoveries of explosives occurred.

Almost exclusively, the thefts involved railway track signals (railway (impact) detonators). Thefts from locked stowage and from tracks (after being temporarily positioned for use) were reported. Juveniles are suspected in these instances.

A few thefts of minor quantities of privately owned explosives, from miners vehicles or residences, also occurred.

Recoveries of commercial explosives low explosives and fabricated Improvised Explosive Devices from known criminal groups indicates the potential for more significant explosive violence to erupt.
Australian Bombing Incidents at a Glance - 2000

Glossary

Bombing (B) - An incident where an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has functioned as designed.

Attempted Bombing (A/B) An incident where there has been an attempt to function an IED. The item has subsequently failed to function as a result of design or construction flaws, or as a result of reactive measures undertaken by response personnel.

Hoax (H) - An item that is placed, designed or manufactured in a manner that is intended to cause another person to believe that it is an IED.

Recovery (R) – Location of explosive components or other IED components that have been identified as stolen.

Theft (T) - The theft of explosives and associated materials.

National Totals
Bombing (B) 222
Attempted Bombing (A/B) 39
Hoax (H) 27
Recovery (R) 66
Theft (T) 19

In the bomb response arena a collaborative effort was assembled, seeing Police Bomb Technician support from the States & Territories, input from national intelligence agencies and significant augmentation from Defence Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Search and specialist Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) response assets.

Whilst the Games proper ran from 15 September – 1 October, the protective security operation spanned 1 September - 29 October. This period encompassed a pre Games sanitisation and shake out, through to the conclusion of the Paralympic Games.

Securing the games from bomb attack was founded on intelligence based risk management, physical protective security and screening, and the pre-positioning of responsive diagnostic and disposal assets.

Intelligence assessments before and throughout the games indicated a low level of threat; however the impact of any event would be significant.

Organisationally, an Olympic Intelligence Centre (OIC) was established to provide intelligence and risk management advice. Where a response was warranted, the Bomb Management Coordination Cell (BMCC) tasked and controlled bomb response assets. Both of these centres formed part of the New South Wales Police Olympic Security Command Centre (OSC), established for the Games.

Any bomb threats made against the Games were subjected to a formalised, yet very fast, consideration process (usually with a 5-15 minute turn around). In essence the net result was to provide formal recorded advice to the Police Venue Commander of the site under threat. This advice was based on reports to date, intelligence assessments and the technical feasibility of the threat. This then gave the Police Venue Commander a sound basis on which to make decisions concerning evacuation, search, diagnostic or disposal requirements.

Games volunteers and employees were given awareness training, with emphasis on vigilance to report the unusual, or unattended bags.

Where concern was aroused, bomb management assets were then tasked. Reconnaissance teams, sited at the venues and equipped with diagnostic equipment, quickly ‘cleared’ mistaken items, or triggered a disposal response.

Render safe and disposal operations were the premise of Bomb Technician Teams, pre-positioned in forward sites, adjacent to a cluster of venues. These teams were only called out after an item had been ‘appraised’ (diagnosed) and was thought to be an Improvised Explosive Device. After being called forward, Bomb Technician Teams would work in direct support of the Police Venue Commander, to quickly clear the hazard and return the site to normalcy.

Post any blast or render safe, timely information would be essential to test against current intelligence estimates, response procedures and enable criminal prosecution. This scenes of crime work was the responsibility of the Forensic Services Group (FSG) of the NSW Police Service, who retained post-blast investigators on call throughout the Games.

Fortunately, there were significantly less Olympic related bomb incidents (that is incidents directed at Olympic venue, event or person connected with the Games) than expected. Bomb threats proved, almost exclusively, to be the major occurrence. Few of these triggered some form of bomb response action. In the main, diagnostic action was required, resulting in positive confirmation that the items were indeed innocuous.

Heightened public awareness led to increased reports of unattended items, around Games venues and in the wider community, as anticipated. At any other time, given the normal Australian environment, such occurrences would normally go by unnoticed.

Few of these reports actually raised enough concern to warrant an evacuation.
Remarkably, the Games elicited less threats than anticipated, resulting in less than two a day being received.

Render safe equipment was only employed once during an Olympic related response, at a venue prior to the Games. The suspicious item proved to be an innocuous hoax.

To complete the picture an increase in call outs in the Sydney area did occur during the September – October period. These incidents were not Olympic related, ie an Olympic venue, event or person was not targeted. Again, these occurrences can largely be attributed to increased public awareness in the broader community and yielded very minor incidents.

Of the 77 non Olympic related incidents that prompted a call out in Sydney, 2 hoax devices, 60 false alarms and 15 cancelled tasks (whilst in transit to the scene) eventuated.

Finally, a summary of the Olympic related bomb activity for the period of the Games is shown in the graph below.
The Coober Pedy Opal Field Bombings, South Australia

Coober Pedy is an opal mining area, some 750 kilometres north west of South Australia's capital, Adelaide.

In an apparent dispute over mining claims, significant explosive attacks occurred on 18 June & 11 August. Substantial property damage resulted with no persons being injured.

Dora Gully Opal Field lies 20 kilometres to the North of Coober Pedy. Late in the evening of 18 June three distinct explosions were heard. Tourists camped 1 kilometre away claim to have been showered with gravel.

In the light of day it became apparent that two large trucks, carrying mining plant, had been destroyed using explosives (estimated damage bill - $100 000).

The sites of three large explosive charges (‘blast seats’) were identified, with debris spread for 150 metres in all directions. Forensic examination indicated it was most likely that a commercial blasting agent (‘Nitropril’), mixed to form a common blasting explosive, had been used.

A simple burning fuse arrangement is thought to have been used to initiate the charges. This method, as is the suspected explosive, are normal mining ‘tools of the trade’ in Coober Pedy.

On the same evening of the Dora Gully explosions, another explosion took place at Brown’s Folly Opal Field, 40 kilometres north of Coober Pedy.

In this event a large single charge of mixed ‘Nitropril’ explosive was thought to have been placed on the tray of a mining truck.

The charge, placed under mining equipment on the back of the truck, destroyed the vehicle and associated equipment, propelling debris for 125 metres. A simple burning fuse is also thought to have been used to initiate this charge, causing $50 000 damage.

Just over 2 months later on 11 August, an on site caravan at Zorba Opal Field (eight kilometres from Coober Pedy) was attacked in the early hours of morning.

An explosive charge, possibly a small amount of ‘Nitropril’, appears to have detonated on top of the caravan’s rear left tyre. The explosion severely damaged the caravan and scattered debris for 90 metres. Some adjacent mining equipment was damaged by secondary fragmentation (flying debris), with damage totalling an estimated $2 500.
The Bombing of Ora Banda Township, Western Australia

Ora Banda is a small remote mining township, with a population of about 30 people, located 650 kilometres east of Perth (West Australia’s Capital City).

In October, a member of a motor cycle gang was shot dead whilst sitting around a camp fire at the town’s show grounds. In a possible revenge attack, the town has been attacked with explosives on two occasions, involving four successfully functioning devices, within a month.

On 13 October explosive devices were placed on the windowsill and in the doorway of the Ora Banda Hotel (above). A small amount of accelerant was also placed inside the hotel.

Each of these devices were thought to be a small quantity of a commercial, ammonium nitrate based, quarrying explosive, initiated by a burning fuse.

Damage was localised but extensive, as can be seen in the photographs.

Then at 2 am on 6 November, an explosion occurred on the doorstep of the General Store (located in the same building as the previously attacked hotel). Some photographs of this attack are below.

The cost of damage sustained in this attacked is estimated to be $20,000.

Ten minutes later, an explosion occurred at the Ora Banda Gold Battery, the town’s small ore crushing plant.

The device, placed on the crusher’s motor, caused severe damage, rendering the plant inoperable. The ensuing fire also gutted a vacant timber residence, adjacent to the Battery. The damage bill in this attack is thought to be around $20,000.

The devices used in both of the November attacks are thought to be the same as used at the Ora Banda Hotel in October.
On 7 November at 1.00 pm a male called the South Australian Police Switchboard. The caller made the threat that he had laid five Improvised Explosive Devices around Adelaide.

He then proceeded to give the location of the first two devices.

About 45 minutes later, a member of the public found the first device (pictured above) in Rundle Mall, a busy shopping precinct. The device was found in a phone box.

Incredibly, the person who found the device picked it up (note the obvious warning note placed on the outside of the box) and used the same phone box to call Police.

When Police arrived, the finder who remained patiently waiting with the device, physically handed it to the bemused officer.

South Australian Police Bomb Response Technicians were then called. The device was subsequently rendered safe and confirmed to be a convincing hoax. Ominously this device was labelled as number ‘1 of 5’ (four to follow?).

Then at 2.15pm a second device, identical to the first, was found by a security guard at the front entrance to the Adelaide Town Hall. The device, although bearing all the hallmarks of the first, was nonetheless independently reassessed, rendered safe and found to be a near identical hoax.

This device at the Town Hall, was labelled as number ‘2 of 5’.

Whilst concluding activities at the second scene, the security guard who found the second device, reported having actually seen a third similar device nearby.

A search based on this third sighting proved fruitless. It is assumed that a curious member of the public probably picked up the device and took it away before Police arrived.

The ‘remaining’ two devices have not come to light. No apparent motive has been identified in this incident.
Incident Types, Targets & Motives - 2000

Incidents by Category & State – 2000

Figures for last year (1999) are shown in (brackets) for comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bombings</th>
<th>Attempted Bombings</th>
<th>Hoaxes</th>
<th>Recoveries</th>
<th>Thefts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>58 (46)</td>
<td>12 (12)</td>
<td>0 (2)</td>
<td>8 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>78 (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>57 (73)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>12 (2)</td>
<td>74 (77)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>50 (64)</td>
<td>10 (15)</td>
<td>6 (3)</td>
<td>27 (5)</td>
<td>3 (1)</td>
<td>96 (88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>23 (28)</td>
<td>7 (1)</td>
<td>4 (2)</td>
<td>14 (2)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>50 (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Australia</td>
<td>20 (3)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
<td>5 (3)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>30 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasmania</td>
<td>6 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>7 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Territory</td>
<td>5 (12)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>9 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>3 (11)</td>
<td>3 (5)</td>
<td>13 (16)</td>
<td>8 (3)</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>29 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>222</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>373</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Motives - 2000

![Pie chart showing motives for bomb incidents in 2000.]

- **Vandalism**: 52% (63%)
- **Unknown**: 11% (NR)
- **Nuisance**: 6% (NR)
- **Revenge**: 5% (2%)
- **Theft/Robbery**: 3% (0%)
- **Other**: 3% (18%)
- **Experimentation**: 20% (NR)
- **Unknown** - Not Recorded

**Others** – Number of Incidents: (1999)
- Domestic Disputes: 3 (9)
- Drug Related: 2 (1)
- Anti Semitic: 2 (NR)
- Arson: 2 (NR)
- Political: 0 (1)
- Family Law Courts: 0 (6)

Percentages for last year (1999) are shown in (brackets) for comparison.

### Target Categories - 2000

![Pie chart showing target categories for bomb incidents in 2000.]

- **Private**: 73% (80%)
- **Government**: 19% (15%)
- **Commercial**: 8% (5%)

Percentages for last year (1999) are shown in (brackets) for comparison.

A deeper analysis appears over.
Analysis of Targets - 2000

Percentages for last year (1999) are shown in (brackets) for comparison

‘NR’ – Not Recorded

Commercial Targets - 2000

- Offices: 12% (10%
- Factory: 8% (5%
- Car Park: 12% (NR)
- Hotel: 8% (NR)
- Clubs: 12% (33%
- Retail: 28% (16%
- Other: 20% (36%

22 Incidents (Bombings & Attempted Bombings)

‘Others’ (Number of Incidents):
- Caravan Park: 4% (1)
- Bank: 4% (1)
- Auto Dealer: 4% (1)
- Mines: 4% (1)
- Food Outlet: 4% (1)

288 Incidents (Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes)

(All Targets – 2000)
Analysis of Targets - 2000

Percentages for last year (1999) are shown in (brackets) for comparison

'NR' – Not Recorded

Government Targets - 2000

- Education 44% (43%)
- Defence 8% (13%)
- Other 19% (30%)
- Phone Boxes 17% (4%)
- Public Toilets 12% (10%)
- Commercial 8% (5%)
- Private 73% (80%)

‘Others’ (Number of Incidents):
- Rail 5% (3)
- Govt Office 5% (3)
- Mail Box 5% (2)
- Medical 2% (1)
- Police 2% (1)

52 Incidents (Bombings & Attempted Bombings)
288 Incidents (Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes)

(All Targets – 2000)
**Analysis of Targets - 2000**

Percentages for last year (1999) are shown in (brackets) for comparison.

‘NR’ – Not Recorded

### Private Targets - 2000

- **Letterbox**
  - 58% (64%)
  - 202 Incidents
  - (Bombings & Attempted Bombings)

- **Open Area**
  - 16% (12%)

- **Residence**
  - 15% (13%)

- **Others**
  - 5% (3%)

- **Motor Vehicle**
  - 6% (8%)

- **Others' (Number of Incidents):**
  - Attack aimed at Individual 2% (4)
  - Church 1.5% (3)
  - Own Goal 1.5% (3)

### (All Targets – 2000)

- **Private** 73% (80%)
- **Government** 19% (15%)
- **Commercial** 8% (5%)

Total Incidents: 288

Bombings & Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes: 202

Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes: 288
Analysis of IED Construction - 2000

Device Fillings - 2000

- CO2 Bulbs: 26% (65%)
- Unknown: 16% (NR)
- Low Explosive: 4% (NR)
- Innocuous (Hoax): 9% (NR)
- Molotov: 6% (5%)
- Incendiary: 5% (11%)
- Pressure Cans: 4% (NR)
- High Explosive: 7% (11%)
- Fireworks: 9% (NR)
- Others: 7% (2%)
- Chemical Reagents: 7% (NR)
- Chemical: 7% (NR)
- Pressure Cans: 4% (NR)
- Low Explosive: 4% (NR)
- Incendiary: 5% (11%)
- High Explosive: 7% (11%)
- Fireworks: 9% (NR)
- Others: 7% (2%)
- Unknown: 16% (NR)
- Innocuous (Hoax): 9% (NR)
- Molotov: 6% (5%)
- Incendiary: 5% (11%)
- High Explosive: 7% (11%)
- Fireworks: 9% (NR)
- Others: 7% (2%)
- Chemical Reagents: 7% (NR)
- Chemical: 7% (NR)
- Pressure Cans: 4% (NR)
- Low Explosive: 4% (NR)
- Incendiary: 5% (11%)
- High Explosive: 7% (11%)
- Fireworks: 9% (NR)
- Others: 7% (2%)

Percentages for last year (1999) are shown in (brackets) for comparison.

Device Initiating Methods - 2000

- Unknown: 29%
- Improvised Wick: 8%
- Sparkler: 22%
- Firework: 11%
- Chemical Reagents: 9%
- Innocuous (Hoax): 10%
- Other: 11%

Statistics of initiating methods for 1999 were not compiled.

‘Others’ (No of Incidents):
- Detonator: 3% (8)
- Sparkler: 1% (3)
- LPG Gas Cylinder: 1% (3)
- Combination: 1% (3)
- HME: <1% (2)
- Accelerant: 3% (8)
- Safety Fuse: 3% (7)
- Timer: 1% (3)
- Command Initiated: <1% (2)
- Victim Operated: <1% (2)
- Electric Match: <1% (2)
- None: <1% (2)
- Hot Wire: <1% (1)
- Blow Torch: <1% (1)
- Cigarette: <1% (1)
- Spring Mechanism: <1% (1)
The 10 Year Trends

Incident Types for the Last 10 Years (1991-2000)

- Bomb
- A/Bomb
- Hoax
- Recovery
- Theft

Year: 1991-2000

No of Incidents

Target Categories for the Last 10 Years (1991-2000)

- Private: 73% (73%)
- Commercial: 11% (8%)
- Government: 16% (19%)

2760 Incidents (Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes)

Percentages for 2000 are shown in (brackets) for comparison

A deeper analysis appears over
### The 10 Year Trends

#### Analysis of the Last 10 Years Targets

Percentages for 2000 are shown in (brackets) for comparison

'NR' – Not Recorded

**Commercial Targets 1991 - 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offices</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Outlets</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clubs</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Others*:  
- Safes 6% (19)  
- Banks 5% (16)  
- Car Dealers 5% (15)  
- Factories 4% (14)  
- Car Parks 3% (12)  
- Mines 3% (10)  
- Cinema 2% (9)  
- Brothels 1% (5)  
- Petrol Stations 1% (4)  
- Caravan Parks <1% (1)

(All Targets 1991-2000)

2760 Incidents  
279 Incidents (Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes)  

Commerical 11% (8%)  
Government 16% (19%)  
Private 73% (73%)
The 10 Year Trends

Analysis of the Last 10 Years Targets

Percentages for 2000 are shown in (brackets) for comparison

‘NR’ – Not Recorded

Government Targets 1991 - 2000

- Education: 31% (44%)
- Government: 8% (5%)
- Defence: 8% (8%)
- Phone Boxes: 9% (17%)
- Public Toilets: 9% (12%)
- Police: 10% (2%)
- Other: 25% (19%)

‘Others’:
- Law Courts: 6% (28)
- Railways: 5% (24)
- Post boxes: 5% (23)
- Prisons: 3% (13)
- Medical: 3% (11)
- Airports: 1% (7)
- Diplomatic: 1% (5)
- Utilities: <1% (1)
- Rubbish Tip: <1% (1)

2760 Incidents
(Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes)

Education 409 Incidents
(Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes)

Commercial 11% (8%)
Private 73% (73%)

(All Targets 1991-2000)
The 10 Year Trends

Analysis of the Last 10 Years Targets

Percentages for 2000 are shown in (brackets) for comparison

'NR' – Not Recorded

Private Targets 1991 - 2000

Letterbox 46% (58%)
Own Goal 4% (1.5%)
Residence 23% (15%)
Open Area 15% (16%)
Other 5% (5%)
Motor Vehicle 7% (6%)

'Others':
• Attack aimed at Individual 2% (50)
• Farm 1% (21)
• Church <1% (17)
• Rubbish Bins <1% (12)
• Drug Plantation <1% (6)
• Boats <1% (6)

2072 Incidents (Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes)

Private 73% (73%)
Government 16% (19%)
Commercial 11% (8%)

(All Targets 1991-2000)
The 10 Year Trends

Percentages for 2000 are shown in (brackets) for comparison

‘NR’ – Not Recorded

Motives for the Last 10 Years (1991 - 2000)

2760 Incidents
(Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes)

Vandalism
26% (52%)

Revenge
5% (5%)

Robbery/Theft
2% (0%)

Political
2% (3%)

Drug
2% (<1%)

Other
7% (3%)

Unknown / Not Reported
55% (11%)

Motives in the ‘Other’ Category include:

- Domestic Disputes 1% (32)
- Business <1% (22)
- Motor Bike Gangs <1% (20)
- Family Law <1% (17)
- Deranged <1% (17)
- Nuisance <1% (16)
- Intimidation <1% (12)
- Industrial Disputes <1% (10)
- Used for Fishing <1% (8)
- Animal Rights <1% (7)
- Fraud <1% (7)
- Suicide <1% (4)
- Environmental Issues <1% (3)
- Murder <1% (2)
The 10 Year Trends

Percentages for 2000 are shown in (brackets) for comparison

Device Fillings for the Last 10 Years (1991 – 2000)

- High Explosives: 18% (7%)
- Low Explosives: 14% (4%)
- Incendiary: 6% (5%)
- Chemical Reagents: 8% (7%)
- CO2 Bulbs: 36% (26%)
- Innocuous (Hoax): 7% (9%)
- Other: 11% (7%)

2760 Incidents (Bombings, Attempted Bombings & Hoaxes)

Fillings in the ‘Other’ Category include:

- Molotov Cocktail: 5% (125)
- HME: 3% (82)
- Flammable Gas: 2% (64)
- Unknown: 2% (45)
The edited article that follows was produced by the Canadian Bomb Data Centre and is kindly used with permission. It is surprisingly relevant to the Australian context, with an increase in low explosive, chemical reaction type devices being experienced this year. Designed as an open letter to teachers and parents, it highlights the potential unfortunate consequences when youthful curiosity is inspired by dangerous information.

Most of the chemical reaction bombs made in this country are the work of young people because obtaining the material is easy and inexpensive; and because anyone with Internet access can readily acquire the instructions for making these bombs from computer bulletin boards.

Chemical reaction bombs pose a substantial threat to both the bomb maker and to others because the reaction times of these bombs are unpredictable. It varies according to the ambient temperature and the nature of the combined components.

These types of bombs are extremely volatile and can easily explode if moved or jarred.

Parents, guardians and teachers should be aware of the common household materials that bomb makers can and do use in their chemical reaction bombs. Unfortunately, what they use does not always make sense because underground recipes can be dangerously inaccurate.

Milk can be used in some chemical reaction bombs so pay attention when you find milk sitting in a container other than a milk carton, a drinking glass or a mixing bowl.

Aluminium foil can also be used in these devices. Make a note if you find pieces of aluminium foil sitting in a fluid inside a sealable glass or plastic container. You may be looking at a bomb.

Instructions for creating an explosive or incendiary device are easily obtainable by youngsters.

Kids can be wildly creative when it comes to making homemade devices. They generally do not have a lot of money so they appropriate whatever material they can get their hands on at home or at school. They have made explosive devices inside toilet-roll tubing, cough candy boxes, 35mm film cartridges and empty audio cassette cases. Anything with a lid or that can be sealed is useable. Beware of taped objects. Tape is often used to contain the explosive and the triggering components and also to conceal the deadly nature of the device. After all, most kids know what they are doing is wrong and that they have to hide their work if they are going to be able to use it.

WHAT DO YOU DO?

Should you become aware that your child is experimenting with explosives, do not attempt to move or dispose of the material or the concoctions you find. Most chemical bombs are unpredictable and might react and detonate, resulting in serious injuries or even death. You are advised to contact your local police department immediately, requesting the assistance of the explosives disposal unit.

Not all homemade devices have dangling wires and make ticking sounds. However, if you do discover a strange object which is wired, ticks or looks at all suspicious, treat it with respect. Your child may actually have replicated a very dangerous explosive weapon. Do not assume that, because he or she is not an adult, the funny looking contraption you have unearthed cannot maim or destroy you.

As parents, teachers or guardians, you must be vigilant at all times and keep in mind that in order to make an explosive device you do not need a large working area. Kids are making bombs in their bedrooms, in basements, garages and their parents’ workshops.

Home Made Explosive ‘Recipes’ from the Internet
Restrict and monitor your children’s access to the Internet where bomb making recipes are readily available, and contact your Internet provider and insist that blocks be introduced to eliminate access to sights depicting violence. You yourself can create a supervisor password by following these steps while on the Internet screen: select VIEW; go to INTERNET OPTIONS; then CONTENT; then CONTENT ADVISOR; depress the ENABLE KEYS (it will take you to a screen entitled “CREATE SUPERVISOR PASSWORD”); read and follow the instructions and click OK.

Another important point is communication and interaction. Educate your children on the potential hazards of fabricating homemade explosive devices and discuss the serious implications that may result from fabricating such objects. Remind them of the possibility of seriously injuring or killing themselves as well as other innocent people, and tell them that if they are caught experimenting with explosives they are liable to be charged with a criminal offence and risk acquiring a criminal record.

In Australia, the past two years has seen home made explosives responsible for the fatality of a 17 year old in Swan Hill (July 1999), severe facial injuries to a 12 year old in Canberra (June 2000) and the traumatic amputation of 17 year olds hand in Melbourne (December 2000). Further, in late November 2000, a Blue Mountains teenager manufactured a quantity of home made explosives which his mother found in the refrigerator.

**Improvised Explosive Devices at Drug Plantations**

The protection of drug plantations and clandestine drug laboratories with Improvised Explosive Devices and mantraps is an enduring practise. Explosive traps have been used to protect as few as 10 plants.

Initially drug protection devices were being employed as early warning devices. Commonly they have now have evolved to become life threatening. The offenders setting these traps show a considerable disregard for the safety of the innocent who may inadvertently come across them whilst enjoying the bush.

Drug protection devices have taken a variety of forms. They have included falling spikes (bear traps) suspended in trees, dingo traps set on the ground, punji stakes/spikes and a variety of mechanical and explosive devices.

When enjoying the bush, walkers and others should be aware of the potential danger associated with booby trap devices. Be alert for anything unusual such as:

- wires strung along walking tracks,
- items taped or wired to trees or stakes, or
- the presence of illegal plants.

It is likely that the devices will become more frequent when close to a plantation or laboratory.

If suspect items, drug plantations, laboratories or drug storage areas are located

**DO NOT TOUCH ANYTHING**

Leave immediately by the same route you entered and contact local Police as soon as possible.
Unexploded Ordnance (Military Ammunition)

Old Military ammunition (Unexploded Ordnance) is not uncommon in the community. Typically the Australian Defence Force responds to some 750-800 community based requests every year.

Unexploded Ordnance, despite best attempts to prevent, locate and destroy it, is an ever-present threat on current ranges used by the Military. It may also be encountered on old disused ranges and training areas, particularly those of World War 2 vintage, or in the home as an old serviceman’s dangerous memento from a past conflict.

There have been a number of fatalities and injuries due to accidents with military ammunition in the past. Most recently was an explosion in Melbourne (March 1989) when a Second World War 37 mm High Explosive Projectile was dropped. The projectile, previously ‘souvenired’ from a current military range, inflicted serious fragmentation injuries to three youths.

Thankfully, there have been no accidents in recent years. However the potential for harm, although low, remains.

A chilling example occurred this year when another 37 mm High Explosive Projectile was taken from a Queensland school child, after he had been striking it.

In the year 2000, Explosive Ordnance Disposal operations by the Australian Defence Force saw:

- 551 Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal tasks conducted,
- 864 820 items recovered (including small arms (fire arms) ammunitions),
- an additional 930 kilograms of small arms ammunition and 136 000 kilograms of inert ammunition recovered,
- 128 152 kilometres travelled, and
- approximately 4 700 man-hours expended on this work.

Although Military Ordnance is rarely used for illegal applications, its presence in the community represents an ongoing safety concern.

Usually designed to kill and maim, as ammunition ages, or after it has been fired, it becomes increasingly dangerous. Unfortunately, it is ammunition in this sort of condition that tends to find its way into the community.

Exposure to weathering can radically alter the appearance of Unexploded Ordnance. 50 years after impact, artillery projectiles (such as the one pictured below) have been found with functional fuzes, that internally, where as good as the day they were made in factory. Perhaps a testament to good brass and machining tolerances, but not so good if the ordnance is accidentally disturbed.

Unfortunately, explosive fillings do not fare so well, with degradation potentially increasing the sensitivity of the explosive fillings. Although the item may look harmless, it is most likely to be more dangerous then ever.

**ALL AMMUNITION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DANGEROUS AND LEFT UNDISTURBED**

If found contact the Police, who in turn will obtain specialist Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal assistance.

A permanent amnesty exists for the surrender of old ammunition, in order to safely remove these hazards from the community. Again, the ordnance should not be moved. Contact Police and an Australian Defence Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operator will be tasked to visit and assist.
The ABDC Bomb Safety Awareness Kit

The kit is a complete reference package designed to assist the building manager or security officer in implementing procedures to combat bomb threats. The kit costs $108.40 (including GST) and individual or additional items can be purchased separately (price indicated in brackets). The kit comprises:

- 1 x Mail Bomb Countermeasures Video ($54.20)
- 1 x ‘Bombs Defusing the Threat’ Handbook ($21.68)
- 1 x Mail Bomb Countermeasures Handbook ($10.84)
- 100 x Bomb Threat Checklists ($10.84) (keep one by every phone)
- 1 X Mail Bomb Recognition Poster ($10.84)

*The two handbooks above are the references cited in Australian Standard AS 3745 (Emergency Control Organization and Procedures for Buildings)*

To obtain the kit, please write (e mail, fax or post) to:

DIRECTOR
AUSTRALIAN BOMB DATA CENTRE
GPO BOX 361
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Facsimile:  02-6287 0770
E-mail: abdc@afp.gov.au

*** DO NOT SEND ANY MONEY - AN INVOICE WILL BE FORWARDED ***

Telephone enquires can be made on (02) 6287 0750
# Mail Bomb Recognition

A suspect item will generally have two of the recognition points but may have only one or none. Look for the following indicators:

- EXCESSIVE SECURING MATERIAL
- EXCESSIVE WEIGHT
- PROTRUDING WIRES OR TIN FOIL
- LOPSIDED OR UNEVENLY WEIGHTED
- OILY STAINS OR DISCOLOURATION
- STIFF OR RIGID ENVELOPE
- IS THE PACKAGE EXPECTED
- VISUAL DISTRACTIONS
- EXCESSIVE POSTAGE
- PROPER NAMES AND TITLES NOT, OR INCORRECTLY USED
- ADDRESS - HANDWRITTEN OR POORLY TYPED
- RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
- COMMON WORDS MISSPELT
- EITHER UNUSUAL OR FOREIGN MAIL
- LACKS ADDRESS OF SENDER

If you find or receive a suspect item:

**Do:**
- NOTIFY SUPERVISOR
- ISOLATE THE ARTICLE
- TRY TO CONFIRM ORIGIN
- EVACUATE IMMEDIATE AREA
- FOLLOW YOUR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

**Do not:**
- ATTEMPT TO OPEN ARTICLE
- IMMERSE IN WATER
- PLACE IN CONFINED SPACE
- TRANSPORT THROUGH CONGESTED AREAS